University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 20
Number 3 Spring, 1990

Article 5

1990

Recent Developments: Maryland v. Buie: Fourth
Amendment Authorizes Warrantless Protective
Sweep of Premises When Officer Possesses
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That the Area
Poses Danger
Tena Touzos

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Touzos, Tena (1990) "Recent Developments: Maryland v. Buie: Fourth Amendment Authorizes Warrantless Protective Sweep of
Premises When Officer Possesses Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That the Area Poses Danger," University of Baltimore Law Forum:
Vol. 20 : No. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol20/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments
sonable suspicion- should be sufficient
involved outweighs the intrusion on the
to justify a limited additional intrusion
individual's fourth amendment interests.
AMENDMENf AUlHORIZES
to investigate thepossibility of their pres[d. The Court found such an exception
W ARRANTLFSS PROTECTIVE SWEEP
ence." [d. at 1095 (quoting Maryland v.
to exist in Teny, where no search warOF PREMISES WHEN OFFICER
rant or probable cause existed. The Terry
POSSESSES REASONABLE
Buie, 72 Md. App. 562, 576, 531 A.2d
Court held that an on-the-street frisk for
ARTICULABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT
1290, 1297 (1988» (emphasis in original).
THE AREA POSES DANGER
weapons was authorized where the offiIn reversing, the Court of Appeals of
cer possessed a reasonable belief based
In Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093
Maryland recognized that when the in(1990), the United States Supreme Court
on specific and articulable facts that the
trusion is slight, as in a stop and frisk on
suspect was armed and dangerous. [d. In
held that the fourth amendment permits
a public street, it can be justified by a
so holding, the Court reasoned that the
a warrantless protective sweep in conreasonable articulable suspicion. Howjunction with an in-home arrest if the
invasion on the individual's fourth
ever, when the sanctity of the home is
searching officer possesses a reasonable
amendment rights was outweighed by
belief based on specific and articulable
the need for police officers to protect
involved, the government must show
that there was probable cause to believe
themselves and others from danger, even
facts that the area to be swept poses a
a serious danger existed. The court of
danger to the officer or others. The Court
where officers may lack probable cause
found probable cause to be an unnecesappeals held that the State had not satisfor an arrest.
Similarly, the Court applied these same
sarily strict standard in justifying protecfied this probable cause standard. [d. The
tive sweeps.
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to
principles to roadside encounters in
determine the level of justification reTwo men committed an armed robMichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
quired by the fourth amendment before
Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1097. There, the Court
bery of a restaurant in Prince George's
conducting a protective sweep.
County, Maryland. One of the men was
upheld the search of the passenger comwearing a red running suit. That same
In arguing the legality of the protective
partment of an automobile where an ofsweep performed, the State of Maryland
ficer possessed a reasonable articulable
day, police obtained arrest warrants for
Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected
set forth two alternative theories: 1) prosuspicion that the suspect was armed and
tective sweeps should be permitted in all
dangerous. [d. Moreover, the Long Court
accomplice in the robbery. In executing
"expressly rejected the contention that
in-home arrests for violent crimes, under
the arrest warrant for Buie at his home,
a reasonableness balancing test; or 2)
Terry restricted preventative searches to
police fanned out through the first and
the person of a detained suspect." [d.
second floors, while one officer shouted
protective sweeps should fall within the
into the basement, ordering anyone
standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
Analogizing the instant case to Terry
(1968), requiring only a reasonable
and Long, the Buie Court compared the
there to emerge. Eventually Buie appeared at the bottom of the stairwell and
risk of danger posed by persons hiding
articulable suspicion that danger exists.
was arrested. Police, thereafter, conBuie, 110 S. Ct. at 1096. Conversely, Buie
on the premises during an in-home arrest
argued that a warrantless protective
to that posed by,a suspect on the street
ducted a protective sweep of the basesweep should never be permitted, exment and seized a red running suit which
or in a roadside encounter. It found the
cept under exigent circumstances. Buie
was found in plain view.
risk of danger during an in-home arrest as
also contended that even if no warrant
great as, if not greater than, an on-theBuie filed a pre-trial motion to suppress
was reqUired, the probable cause stanstreet or roadside encounter for two reathe running suit. Despite finding no probsons: 1) a protective sweep, unlike a
dard should not be relaxed. Furtherable cause to search the basement, the
more, even if this standard was relaxed,
Terry or Long frisk, has already escalated
court denied the motion, and the running
suit was allowed into evidence. Buie was
to the point of arrest; and 2) unlike a
Buie contended that the State had not
proven that a reasonable articulable susstreet or roadside encounter, an in-home
convicted of robbery with a deadly
arrest places an officer at a disadvantage
picion existed. [d.
weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony. The Court of Special
In an opinion delivered by Justice
because he is on adversarial territory. [d.
Since the same interests of Terry and
White, the Supreme Court first acknowlAppeals of Maryland affirmed. It deterLong existed in the instant case, the
mined that once police lawfully enter a
edged the general rule that a search is not
home, their conduct should be governed
reasonable absent a warrant issued on
Court reasoned that the same standard
should apply.
by a standard of reasonableness. "[I]f
probable cause. [d. at 1096-97 (citing
there is reason to believe that the arrestee
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
Thus, the Court agreed with the State's
had accomplices who are still at large,
argument that a warrant was not reqUired
462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983». Exceptions to
something less than probable cause-reathis rule arise where the public interest
but cautioned that entering a room not
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searched prior to the arrest is not a de
minimis intrusion that may be ignored.
[d. at 1098. The Court held that incident
to the arrest, an officer, without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, could
search places immediately adjoining the
area of arrest from which an attack could
be launched. [d. Beyond that, however,
"there must be articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from these facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger... " [d.
In so holding, the Court emphasized
the limited scope of a protective sweep;
that is, it should be confined to a cursory
visual inspection, not a full search, of
areas where a person may be found. It
may last as long as is necessary to relieve
the suspicion of danger but no longer
than is necessary for the arrest and departure. [d. at 1099.
Moreover, the Court maintained that
its holding did not conflict with Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Buie,
110 S. Ct. at 1099. The Chimel Court held
that a warrantless but justifiable search
incident to an in-home arrest was limited
to the arrestee's person and the area from
which he could obtain a weapon. The
Court distinguished Chimel in two ways:
1) it was concerned with preventing a
full blown search of a house for evidence
unrelated to the arrest, unlike the more
limited intrusion of a protective sweep;
and 2) the justification for the search was
the threat posed by the arrestee, not by
unseen third parties. [d.
Relying on Terry and Long, the Supreme Court held that warrantless protective sweeps of private dwellings
during an arrest are to be measured by a
reasonable articulable suspicion standard. By relaxing the general rule requiring probable cause, abuse of police
discretion in determining the necessity
and scope of a protective sweep may
result. However, the Court has yet to
recognize the validity of such speculative
concerns.
-Tena Touzos

the Supreme Court stated that "where
the City's compelling interest in the
the privacy interests implicated by the
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the
search are minimal, and where an imporpublic. [d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. Thus,
tant governmental interest furthered by
the court of appeals reversed the trial
the intrusion would be placed in jeopcourt's ruling.
ardy by a requirement of individualized
In September of 1986, the City of Ansuspicion, a search may be reasonable
napolis proposed to the unions a drug
despite the absence of such suspicion."
testing plan, which required police and
fire fighters, as part of their regularly[d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (quoting Skinscheduled periodic physical examinaner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417).
tions, to submit urine samples to ascerIn applying the Supreme Court holdtain the presence of illegal drugs. Id. at
ings of Skinner and Von Raab to United
Food, the court of appeals focused on the
546, 565 A.2d at 672-73. One year later,
degree of intrusiveness of the "actual"
after the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the details of the proassaying of the urine sample for drug use,
gram, the City flied a complaint of unfair
instead of the mandatory taking of the
sample. [d. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. The
labor practices with the State Mediation
court reasoned that the employees had
and Conciliation Service. [d. The City
alleged in its complaint that the unions
already been providing samples for analfailed to negotiate in good faith. [d. The
ysis as part of their regularly-scheduled
physical examinations. [d. Recognizing
State Mediation and Conciliation Service
that the actual assaying of samples for
found that the drug testing program was
not unconstitutional as an unreasonable
drug use constituted a search, the court
search and seizure and allowed the City
in United Food found that the instrusion
to implement its program. The unions,
on employees' reasonable expectation of
privacy was not only "minimal" under
seeking to prevent implementation of
the program, appealed to the Circuit
Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible
for four reasons. Id.
Court for Anne Arundel County. Id. at
54748, 565 A.2d at 673-74. The circuit
First, the employees in United Food
court found that the plan was unconstireceived three distinct notices of testing:
(1) that the physical would be during
tutional under the fourth amendment,
because it was not based on individualtheir "birthday" month; (2) within thirty
ized suspicion of drug use among the
days, they knew the week of the examiemployees. [d. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674.
nation; and (3) within forty-eight hours,
The lower court then issued a writ of
they knew the time ofthe physical. [d. at
mandamus enjoining the city from imple554, 565 A.2d at 67&77. Second, the
disclosure of "private facts," including
menting its program. [d. at 550, 565 A.2d
at 675. The City appealed the circuit
evidence of physical infirmities or latent
court's decision, and the Court of Apdiseases, was already part of the regular
peals of Maryland granted certiorari prior
physical examination. [d. at 554-55, 565
to consideration by the court of special
A.2d at 677. Therefore, no reasonable
appeals. [d.
expectation of privacy existed with regard to the disclosure of private facts. [d.
In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals relied primarily on two recent
Third, employees were required to comSupreme Court cases that were decided
plete a medication form to determine
whether a positive test could have reafter the lower court's ruling. In the first
sulted from an employee's lawful use of
case, National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
drugs. [d. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (em(1989), the Court upheld mandatory susphasis added). Although certain private
picionless drug testing of Customs Servmedical facts might be disclosed on the
ice
employees
involved
in
medication form, the same facts would
drug
City ofAnnapolis v. United Food &
interdiction or who carried a firearm.
be the subject of inquiry during a routine
Commercial Worker~ Local 400:
physical examination. [d. Thus, compleUnited Food, 317 Md. at 551, 565 A.2d
DRUG TFSTING OF CITY POIlCE
tion of the medication form was not a
at 675. In the second case, Skinner v.
AND FIRE FIGIITERS WAS Nor AN
significant invasion of privacy. Fourth,
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S.
UNCONS1mJfIONAL SFARCH AND
Ct. 1402 (1989), the Court approved Fedregular physical examinations were used
SEIZURE WHEN CONDUCfED DUReral Railroad Administration regulations
to promote physical fitness and treat emING A REGUlARLY-SCHEDULED
ployees with drug abuse problems. [d. at
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
that mandated testing of blood and urine
In City ofAnnapolis v. United Food &
samples for drug use by employees fol555-56,565 A.2d at 677-78.
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317
lowing major train accidents. United
The court of appeals next considered
Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989), the Court
Food, 317 Md. at 551,565 A.2d at 675.
the governmental interests advanced by
of Appeals of Maryland held that the
Both Skinner and Von Raab held that
the drug tests. In Von Raab, the Supreme
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of
the collection and testing of urine was a
Court identified two govermental interpolice and flfe fighters did not violate the
"search" and implicated the proctection
ests of a compelling nature which supof the fourth amendment. Id. (citing
fourth amendment. The court of appeals
ported drug tests for certain Customs
reasoned that the police and flfe fighters'
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; Von Raab,
Service employees as "ensuring that
privacy interests were outweighed by
109 S. Ct. at 1390). However, in Skinner,
front-line interdiction personnel are
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